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Corporate Tax Havens: Analysis of an Aggressive Tax Approach as a Strategic Necessity for 
Large Multinational Corporations 
Abstract 
This study will examine the complexities of corporate tax planning, with a focus on tax deferral 
strategies employed by United States multinational corporations, providing a financial and 
ethical analysis of corporate tax entities. The focus will be on multinational corporations, 
primarily Fortune 500 Companies. It will then evaluate trends across industries and contrast the 
patterns of unrecognized tax benefits reported by large and small scale public companies. 
Additionally, the paper will analyze the effective tax rate paid by a sample of corporations of 
varying size and industry, and how these characteristics of the business correlate with this rate. 
The study will include a foundational background on corporate tax havens, the benefits of 
deferred taxation, and an outsider’s perspective on the subject matter – namely, the difference in 
perception of the general public versus that of a shareholder. Furthermore, this paper will 
reference case studies of large multinational corporations that have received publicity for their 
tax avoidance strategies. While the acceptability corporate tax havens is an area of controversy, 
and many argue that corporations have an obligation as global citizens to pay taxes, this paper 
will present that in order to remain competitive as a large, multinational public company, an 
aggressive tax deferral strategy can be not only instrumental, but essential to success. 
Background 
For decades, one of the most distinctive hallmarks of a successful, industry-leading 
multinational corporation has been the strategic implementation of an aggressive tax strategy. 
While the objectives of such strategies include goals such as maximizing shareholder value, 
reducing expenses, and maximizing after-tax income, the role of corporate tax havens is often 
viewed by its critics as a tradeoff with corporate social responsibility (Dharmapala 2008). When 
multinational corporations implement an international tax strategy to reduce their effective tax 
rate, some professionals argue that corporations have a social responsibility to pay taxes, rather 
than use any conceivable means to reduce them (Dowling 2013). While corporate social 
responsibility may not have an immediate financial impact for shareholders, it endorses a 
corporation’s reputation and integrity, and thereby encourages investment. Indeed, many Fortune 
500 corporations walk a fine line between effective and permissible tax havens and their much 
less ethical counterpart – aggressive tax shelters. However, I will later present that Fortune 500 
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corporations have survived the competitive and capitalist nature of American business with the 
assistance of such forward tax haven implementation. A sample of large multinational 
corporations across a variety of industries all report lower effective tax rates, and proportionately 
larger unrecognized tax benefits than their smaller public counterparts within their respective 
industries. 
International Approaches for Taxing Foreign Income of Corporations 
Traditionally, there are two widely practiced and recognized approaches for taxing 
foreign income.  The most common approach (among countries that are not tax havens 
themselves) is the Territorial scheme, in which a nation will tax income generated within its 
borders, regardless of whether the corporation is domestic or foreign (Dharmapala 2008). For 
example, if no creative tax strategy were applied, a parent company based in Country A with a 
subsidiary in Country B would pay tax according to Country A’s provisions for the parent 
company’s income, and according to Country B’s tax law for the subsidiary’s income.  
Alternatively, the United States and Japan subscribe to the Worldwide system of taxation. 
This system taxes all income earned by corporations based in the aforementioned countries, 
regardless of the country where the income is earned. Countries known for subscribing to the 
Worldwide approach to taxation implement some of the highest marginal tax rates. However, 
these countries implement a foreign tax credit to counteract potential double taxation. 
(Dharmapala 2008). Since United States based corporations only pay United States taxes on their 
repatriated foreign earnings – taxes on all other foreign earnings are deferred until the time of 
repatriation – this ultimately does not significantly differ from foreign nations which only tax 
income earned within their borders. Earnings per share see an increase from this deferral of 
unrepatriated earnings. In order for multinational corporations to continue deferral, they must 
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attest that these foreign earnings are indefinitely reinvested, thus the books treat these foreign 
earnings as if they were never paid, and the company does not record a corresponding deferred 
tax liability.  
From a financial reporting perspective, United States based corporations report current 
year net income from international operations in year income is earned. However, under the 
United States worldwide system of tax, income from international operations is generally not 
reported on federal tax return, as it is deferred from United States taxation until income is 
repatriated back to the country as dividend or other payment. At this point, it is taxed on a 
residual basis, that is, the repatriated earnings are taxed to extent that the United States rate 
exceeds the foreign tax rate (Donohoe et. al. 2012). 
Research by Carlos Jiménez-Angueira (2008) at the University of San Antonio 
demonstrates that large companies reserve uncertain tax positions as a form of earnings 
management. Items such as indefinitely reinvested foreign earnings may be treated as a sort of 
cookie jar reserve that could be reversed in reporting periods of less profitability, as a means of 
decreasing financial volatility period over period. Ultimately, combination of contributing 
factors, including industry and organizational elasticity determine the size of such a benefit that a 
corporation would accumulate over time (Bucovetsky and Haufler 2006). 
How Multinational Corporations are Deferring Taxation on Foreign-Earned Income 
Regardless of the nation’s approach, multinational corporations are able to defer taxation 
in one way or another. Later on, this paper will examine how successful Fortune 500 companies 
such as Google have structured their tax havens, but more generally, advantageous tax haven 
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strategies can be implemented through a corporation’s debt structure; borrowing in a country that 
has high tax rates and directing interest payments to countries with much lower tax rates.  
Corporations also reduce their tax expense through the implementation of transfer pricing 
on inter-entity transactions. Governments typically require arms-length transactions, but 
multinational corporations use transfer pricing to their advantage (Dharmapala 2008). Typically, 
transfer pricing refers to when a foreign subsidiary located in a low tax country sells assets to the 
United States based corporation at artificially inflated price. Since the tax rate on United States-
earned income is greater than that of the foreign country where the subsidiary is located, firms 
bypass these higher tax brackets via their artificially inflated inter-entity prices, directing most of 
the profit to the foreign tax entity. The United States tax rates would then only be applied to the 
proportionally small markup on the asset sale to the final customer, resulting in a lower tax 
expense on domestically earned profits (Wilson 2007). 
Finally, and perhaps most well-known, are offshore intellectual property havens. This tax 
strategy is implemented by a multinational corporation establishing a subsidiary in a low tax 
foreign nation (commonly Bermuda or other Caribbean island countries). The subsidiary buys 
intellectual property from the parent company and collects royalties from sales of this 
trademarked or patented property. For U.S. based corporations, royalties earned on intellectual 
property must be reported to IRS, but payments made from the foreign subsidiary back to the 
U.S. are under discretion, and therefore often minimal, thus reducing the effective tax rate 
(Donohoe et. al. 2012).  
Which international ventures prove most favorable? 
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Tax havens are typically found in countries with stable legal and political systems and 
low levels of corruption (Dharmapala 2008). While these seem to be positive traits and favorable 
environments, the public still historically perceives tax havens as a crooked means of shifting 
dollars where they should not be. Tax havens are typically established in relatively wealthy 
nations, particularly those with small populations, and are commonly found on island countries 
(Dharmapala 2008). These island countries or other regions tend to be dependent territories, 
often subscribing to a legal and political system than mirrors that of England -- common law and 
a parliamentary legislature (Dharmapala 2008).  
As Ireland’s corporate tax rate is a mere 12.5%, less than 1/3 of that in the United States, 
it is a common tax haven location for the manufacturing industry. The Cayman Islands and other 
island nations are more common target locations for the “post office box” type of tax haven. 
These havens, popular for intellectual property sales, require only a mailbox owned by the 
corporation to qualify as a physical location and reap the nation’s generous tax benefits. 
Tax Havens and Book Tax Differences 
Organically, book-tax differences drive from factors such as depreciation, but beginning 
in the 1990’s there was a substantial increase across many large corporations that resulted from 
other factors, namely aggressive tax strategies (Wilson 2007). Firms likely to use tax shelters 
often report larger ex post book tax differences, and commonly have aggressive financial 
statement reporting (Wilson 2007). It should be noted that permanent book tax differences are 
never deductible, while temporary differences are, if favorable. Recent trends have shown that 
book-tax differences have a positive correlation with the participation in tax havens (Wilson 
2007). Investors tend to interpret large positive book-tax differences as a red flag, leading them 
to question the integrity of the firm’s tax strategy (Wilson 2007).  
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Across industries, recent years have shown an overall increase in book tax differences. 
The 1990’s saw a growing variance between book and tax income. The variance grew from 
$92.5 billion in 1996 to $159 billion in 1998 (Wilson 2007). Stock options, international 
operations, and depreciation are common, less controversial contributors, yet these account for 
less than 50% of the 1998 BTD cited (Wilson 2007). Some studies attribute the difference to 
aggressive financial reporting to simply defer tax expense, but not necessarily indicate the use of 
tax havens (Wilson 2007). While firms are required to accrue for a loss on any uncertain tax 
positions if loss is “probable and reasonably estimable,” this is designated as a tax cushion and of 
course the designation as “probable and estimable” is a matter of management discretion. 
Unrecognized Tax Benefits 
 Firms are required to disclose unrecognized tax benefits on their books when their 
uncertain tax positions may not be sustained. This term refers to tax reductions that have been 
claimed on corporate returns, but will unlikely pass an audit. For multinational corporations, they 
are primarily used as a means of moving profits to tax havens. Unrecognized tax benefits present 
a challenge as an indicator of tax aggressiveness. This is because corporations who implement 
aggressive tax planning are also likely to practice aggressive financial reporting. While an 
aggressive tax approach would likely correlate with high unrecognized tax benefits, conservative 
financial reporting would typically result in just the opposite. Managers face a tradeoff between 
increasing book income, and therefore tax expense, and minimizing taxable income and tax 
expense, which thereby increases financial reporting costs (Frank et. al. 2009). While companies 
with political power and leverage commonly have high unrecognized tax benefits, these high 
balances more often correlate with corporations that are moving dollars to international tax 
havens (Kim and Zhang 2013). 
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Corporate Social Responsibility – Does the Public Care about Low Effective Tax Rates?  
Large multinational corporations that are able to drastically reduce their effective tax rate 
are often criticized doing so, the argument being that these companies have a social 
responsibility to pay taxes, even if they can legally avoid them (Dowling 2013). In complying 
with the IRS, these corporations are subject to obeying the letter of the law, but the CSR 
argument is whether they are obeying the spirit of the law. CSR is a term founded on the belief 
that corporations should consider more than just profit maximization, but the social implications 
of their actions as well. CSR supporters believe tax minimization to be a morally corrupt 
business practice, viewing it in the same light as corporations which cut costs through damaging 
the environment or providing poor working conditions. Fisher (2014) states that such negative 
publicity surrounds tax avoidance practices that long term financial benefits are greater than the 
initial benefits of establishing tax havens. 
However, as long as these firms are acting within the law, I would argue that an 
aggressive tax haven strategy is essential for large multinational corporations to remain 
competitive. If an individual multibillion dollar firm were to pay the statutory 35% federal tax 
rate, their financial performance would not hold a candle to their industry peers, and the investor 
community would look upon it unfavorably. In short, the firm would not survive the economic 
competition of its cohorts (Dowling 2013).    
In 1999, it was estimated that United States corporations avoid upwards of $10 billion per 
year through the use of tax arbitrage, and this number has only grown since. While  the IRS often 
pursues individuals with offshore accounts and tax havens with increased audit scrutiny 
(Dowling 2013), firms are not required to disclose their tax shelter involvement on their 10-K. 
For multinational corporations, tax haven information only becomes known ex post, through a 
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court case, divestiture, or other extreme consequence. Even then, it is nearly impossible to 
evaluate the tax benefit received from the use of tax havens (Wilson 2007). 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 effectively pushed multinational corporations into foreign 
tax havens, as other loopholes were eliminated. To cut costs, tax expense was an easy target 
(Wilson 2007). Corporations in United States are only required to disclose “significant” 
subsidiaries. Exhibit 21 on the 10-K is intended to disclose all significant foreign subsidiaries 
and their country of origin. Significant subsidiaries are defined as those with assets or pretax 
income from continuing operations that is greater than 10% of the consolidated amount 
(Donohoe et. al. 2012). 
In contrast, the United Kingdom’s Companies Act of 2006 requires corporations to 
disclose all subsidiaries and their location for financial reporting purposes. This regulation 
applies to companies which are based in the United Kingdom, but not to British subsidiaries of 
corporations of international origin. This level of detail in financial disclosure is extremely 
costly, so much so that corporations oftentimes willingly elect to pay a fine for incomplete 
disclosure rather than comply (Dyreng et. al. 2014). 
Non-Tax Costs of an Aggressive Tax Strategy 
In addition to the tax aggressiveness/corporate social responsibility tradeoff, there are 
significant non-tax costs of implementing tax havens and international subsidiaries than cannot 
be entirely overlooked. Particularly for physical entities overseas, reorganization costs, training 
of new employees, and the impacts of time difference can be quite costly.  From a tax auditor 
perspective, disclosing all subsidiaries and investments would be require significant resources. 
Reputational cost should also be considered -- shareholders favor more income and appreciation 
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in shares, however if they do not support the business strategy of a corporation, they will not 
invest at all (Heller 2014).  
Public Perception 
While the public may perceive tax havens as corrupt, a robust argument can be made that 
they represent strategic business. Corporate executives and decision makers are adverse to public 
scrutiny, yet investors have learned to interpret unrecognized tax benefits as an indication of 
higher earnings. Because the corporation will be paying a reduced tax expense, the logic is that 
the company has strong strategic leadership in positioning itself to pay less in taxes (Dyreng et. 
al. 2014). Additionally, the company’s “obligation to shareholders” to maximize value can be 
substantially achieved through minimizing tax expense (Drucker 2010).  
Firms typically disclose very little information in regards to geographic operations and 
foreign tax structures. Multinational corporations’ 10Ks require the disclosure of earnings by 
region, but defining the scope of that region is up to the firm’s discretion (Dyreng et. al. 2014). 
Ever-changing disclosure requirements cause firms to adjust their tax position, to reduce number 
of havens, and implement new reporting procedures. Any multinational corporation is reluctant 
to disclose any more information than is explicitly required by the SEC (Dyreng et. al. 2014). 
Rather, corporations often only disclose “significant locations”, with little to no insight to 
completeness of this list or whether these are physical offices staffed with employees or simply 
serving a post box purpose. If the exact location were to be revealed, investors and competitors 
can make an educated guess (for example, a location in the Cayman Islands is likely to be merely 
a post box), but even this basic information is not required by the SEC. 
How Fortune 500 Companies are Minimizing Current Tax Expense 
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As previously noted, aggressive financial statement reporting often goes hand in hand 
with aggressive tax reporting, which is a management tactic consistently employed by large 
multinational corporations. Since effective tax planning very well can increase shareholder 
value, investors are often less likely to scrutinize an aggressive tax strategy if they are reaping 
the benefits via greater dividends (Wilson 2007). 
Book tax differences are also a useful vessel for tax aggressiveness, but if they are 
significant enough in size, this could be interpreted as a red flag by the investor community. If 
book tax differences are disproportionately large, and continue to accumulate exponentially over 
time, this could indicate controversial tax sheltering. In particular, research has shown a positive 
correlation in long term accrual based earnings and tax sheltering (Wilson 2007). However, 
investors concerned with these risks are also positively influenced by corporations with strong 
financial performance. As earnings per share increases, corruption speculation decreases (Wilson 
2007). 
Long run tax avoidance has a positive correlation with firm size, size being evaluated 
based on total assets. Firms which use tax shelters also often tend to have less debt, on average, 
than their peers in size and industry, as management has gone to great lengths to minimize tax 
expense. Wilson’s research also acknowledges the possibility that this relationship is actually 
reversed; that firms have less debt because they have a lower tax expense, through the 
implementation of tax havens (Wilson 2007). 
It should be noted that in the United States, it is a criminal penalty for a corporation to 
disclose total taxable income (Wilson 2007). Corporations disclose their income before taxes, 
and then the taxes actually paid, but not taxable income itself. This omission enables some of the 
most successful corporations to maintain confidential and exclusive tax strategies (Wilson 2007). 
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Controversy and Case Studies 
Google has a very intricate and tactical tax strategy that has been studied by many. Notably, 
the company’s international operations is headquartered in Dublin. The office accommodates 
over 2,000 employees, and claims 88% of Google’s $12.5 billion in foreign sales, but most 
profits are directed to a tax haven in Bermuda. In fact, Google has saved an estimated $3.1 
billion just since 2007 through its tax structure. While the corporation has boasted high earnings 
and consistent growth year over year, it undeniable that this complex tax strategy is a 
contributing factor to Google’s continued success (Donohoe et. al. 2012).  
Since 2007, Google has paid a tax rate of 2.4% on foreign earnings, while its peers such as 
Microsoft, Oracle, Apple, and IBM (the top 5 technology companies) have reported effective tax 
rates of 4.5-25.8% on their own foreign earnings. Expert tax economist Martin A. Sullivan, 
whose credentials include work for the United States Treasury Department, finds it impressive 
that Google is able to reach such a low effective tax rate when the corporation operates 
predominately in high tax countries (corporate rates of over 20%; 35% in the United States – 
where Google has the largest market, and 28% in U.K. – home to Google’s second largest 
market (Donohoe et. al. 2012)). 
Google achieves such a low effective tax rate primarily through redirecting income to 
Bermuda, where there is no corporate income tax. When an international company (located 
outside of the United States and therefore not a domestic sale) purchases advertisements through 
Google, payment is directed toward Google Ireland. Irish tax on corporate profits are 12.5%, 
however since Google’s earnings do not remain in the Ireland office, the company is exempt 
from paying this tax.  Since Irish tax laws would require Google to make a large tax payment, 
were the money to be sent directly to Bermuda, the payment is first directed to the Netherlands. 
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Ireland does not tax qualified payments to other European Union members, so this transfer is 
exempt from paying tax to Ireland (Donohoe et. al. 2012). 
Google’s office in the Netherlands is essentially a “post box office,” as it does not have 
employees, so the Netherlands office passes approximately 99.8% of the original payment from 
the customer to Bermuda. Thus, the company’s profits are shifted overseas through transfer 
pricing (Donohoe et. al. 2012). 
Across many Fortune 500 companies, there has been an increasing trend in disclosing fewer 
“significant subsidiaries,” and Google is no exception. Google disclosed 108 of such subsidiaries 
in 2009 and only 2 (both located in Ireland) in 2011. The growing public interest in offshore 
accounts and where companies are forming tax havens has driven multinational corporations to 
be more discrete regarding their tax strategies, disclosing fewer locations over time (Donohoe et. 
al. 2012).  
Microsoft has had considerable success in reducing its effective tax rate as well, 
experiencing a decrease of 15.6% as a result of “foreign earnings taxed at lower rates” for fiscal 
year end June 2011. This reduction translated into an impressive $4.4 billion in federal income 
tax savings (Donohoe et. al. 2012). 
In addition to transfer pricing strategies, large multinational corporations also have the 
flexibility to change an assertion on whether unrepatriated earnings are permanently reinvested. 
This creates an opportunity to manage tax strategy via a potential cookie jar reserve. In recent 
years, General Electric has repatriated foreign earnings previously designated as indefinitely 
reinvested on multiple occasions (Velarde 2015). In 2009, GE decreased the disclosed amount of 
indefinitely reinvested earnings by $2 billion, resulting in a $700 million tax benefit (per their 
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statement in 10K) (Donohoe et. al. 2012). In April 2015, the company announced that it will be 
repatriating additional earnings and deferred tax assets, thereby reducing the size of its financial 
services business and generating a tax expense of $7 billion. Over the next two years, GE will be 
repatriating $36 billion in cash, resulting in $23 billion in after-tax expenses (Velarde 2015). If 
this trend of repatriating previously indefinitely reinvested earnings continues, GE’s tax expense 
will continue to grow. 
Regulations regarding Tax Havens 
§210.4-08(h)(1), Income Tax Expense states that the SEC requires companies to disclose 
income or loss before tax expense/benefit, classifying the income as either domestic or foreign. 
The SEC defines foreign income as income earned from company’s foreign operations – outside 
of its country of origin. U.S. companies are required to designate between foreign income and 
foreign income taxes for such income when foreign income is more than 5% of total income 
before taxes, or (less likely) than foreign taxes are more than 5% of total tax expense (Donohoe 
et. al. 2012). 
FAS 109, passed in 1982, requires that for balance sheet purposes, a company must 
increase accounting stock basis in foreign subsidiaries by the amount of that subsidiary’s 
unrepatriated earnings. When a company repatriates earnings, this reduces stock basis by amount 
of distribution. However, a company does not increase tax stock basis in foreign subsidiaries by 
unrepatriated earnings if earnings are deferred from United States tax, thus creating a book-tax 
difference (Donohoe et. al. 2012). 
Additionally, disclosure rules require specific plans for reinvestment of foreign earnings. 
Corporations are required to provide such evidence when there is a history of asserting the 
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intention to reinvest indefinitely, but only a portion of these earnings are in fact reinvested. 
When firms maintain that they will reinvest indefinitely despite a prior history of repatriation, the 
SEC examines their filings with additional scrutiny (Ernst & Young LLP 2013). 
Sample of Corporations 
Larger Fortune 500 companies have significantly lower effective tax rates than those of 
smaller public companies, across industries (Zimmerman 1983). In this sample, small public 
companies often paid an effective tax rates greater than the 35% federal rate, while larger public 
companies paid significantly lower rates. These large multinational corporations use tax havens 
and aggressive deferral strategies to pay less than the statutory 35% for corporations earning in 
excess of $18,333,333. 
The table below illustrates the effective tax rates paid by a sample of multinational 
corporations from 2007 to 2013. The upper section of the chart shows the large corporations, 
those which are Fortune 500 ranked, and the lower section shows smaller public corporations. 
The implementation of tax havens and complex corporate tax strategy that is often only possible 
with the resources a large corporation has. These corporations consistently pay below the 
statutory federal rate of 35%, and sometimes a negative rate, and both General Electric and Ford 




The smaller companies, in the lower section of the table, are consistently paying much 
closer to, if not greater than the federal statutory rate of 35%. These corporations often do not 
have the means or expert personnel to choreograph an aggressive tax haven strategy. They are 
smaller, some of them newly public, and establishing tax havens abroad requires informed 
corporate executives, financial and logistical resources, and furthermore, if the havens will not be 
saving millions of dollars as they do for the larger corporations, they may not be worth the 
painstaking process of being established. While it was not surprising that large multinational 
corporations reported lower effective tax rates than small ones, I did not expect such volatility in 
the effective rates year over year. Such companies dedicate substantial resources to their tax 
planning initiative, and while their effective rates are consistently below 35%, they have 
fluctuated drastically since 2007. Over the past seven years, GE’s effective tax rate has spanned 
a range of -11.5% to 28.5%, due in part to the implications of bringing cash back to United 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
GE 15.6% 5.6% -11.5% 7.4% 28.5% 14.6% 4.2%
UTC 27.1% 27.4% 27.9% 29.0% 24.8% 26.9%
Coca Cola 24.0% -0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 24.5% 23.1% 24.8%
Pepsi 25.8% 26.7% 26.0% 23.0% 26.8% 25.2% 23.7%
McDonalds 34.6% 30.0% 29.8% 29.3% 31.3% 32.4% 31.9%
Target 38.4% 37.4% 35.7% 35.1% 34.3% 34.9% 36.5%
Apple 30.0% 30.0% 31.8% 24.4% 24.2% 25.2% 26.2%
UPS 11.4% 40.1% 36.1% 36.8% 34.1% 17.1% 34.5%
Ford 31.1% -0.4% -4.7% 9.0% -141.1% 28.8% 2.5%
Cisco 20.3% 17.5% 17.1% 20.8% 11.1%
Boston Beer 46.0% 48.9% 42.8% 38.2% 36.2% 37.7% 37.5%
Popeyes 37.4% 39.8% 38.0% 31.0% 34.6% 36.3% 37.4%
Hanes 31.5% 22.0% 12.0% 9.6% 14.8% 11.6% 16.5%
J&J Snacks 38.0% 35.0% 37.0% 35.0% 37.0%
Keurig 38.9% 38.2% 40.3% 33.6% 36.9% 34.7%
Avon 33.0% 27.8% 32.2% 37.0% 31.1% 78.2% 100.6%
Starbucks 36.0% 31.0% 30.0% 34.0% 31.1% 32.8% 32.6%




States shores, and subjecting earnings that were previously permanently reinvested to federal 
taxes. 
The table below demonstrates the unrecognized tax benefits reported by the same sample 
of corporations, from 2007 to 2013. The relative size of these tax benefits clearly mirror the 
trends in the effective tax rates paid by these corporations. The lower the effective tax rate, the 
more likely it is that a corporation will have a large, and growing unrecognized tax benefit. 
While tax havens are not the sole contributor to these unrecognized tax benefits, they are a major 
driver, and, not surprising, their balance tends to grow over time. 
 
Multinational corporations that have successfully implemented tax havens have seen 
significantly lower effective tax rates and growing unrecognized tax benefits, as compared to 
small corporations that do not have the means to implement a complex international tax strategy. 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
GE 6,331          6,692            7,251            6,139            5,230            5,445            5,816            
UTC 545             698                903                977                904                942                980                
Coca Cola 643             369                354                387                320                302                230                
Pepsi 1,711            1,731            2,022            2,167            2,425            1,268            
McDonalds 250             273                492                573                565                482                513                
Target 442             434                452                302                236                216                183                
Apple -              506                971                943                1,375            2,062            2,714            
UPS 355             388                266                284                252                232                191                
Ford 1,810          1,898            1,173            1,063            1,547            1,547            1,564            
Cisco -              -                2,816            2,677            2,948            2,819            1,775            
Boston Beer 7                  5                    7                    7                    2                    1                    1                    
Popeyes 5                  5                    5                    2                    2                    1                    1                    
Hanes 14                25                  40                  30                  42                  49                  48                  
J&J Snacks 2                  2                    2                    1                    1                    1                    0                    
Keurig 1                  1                    0                    6                    24                  24                  27                  
Avon 154             104                113                84                  36                  36                  28                  
Starbucks -              53                  49                  68                  53                  75                  89                  
Nordstrom 27                28                  43                  43                  21                  15                  14                  
Unrecognized Tax Benefits ($M)
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While tax havens can be subject to public scrutiny, oftentimes, when they are within the laws and 
regulations of the tax code, investors view them to be a positive attribute. Although corporate 
social responsibility cannot be ignored, the most profitable corporations of the world do not 
maintain their status as such by paying the statutory 35% of income to the IRS. They maintain 
their financial success and status as industry leaders through innovative strategy, a part of which 
is tax minimization. While tax havens may be controversial at first glance, they are essential to 
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